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HASKER’S QUESTS FOR A VIABLE SOCIAL THEORY
Dale Tuggy
In a series of papers, William Hasker, in conversation with important recent 
work in philosophical theology, has carefully articulated and argued for a 
version of “social” trinitarianism. I argue that this theory should be rejected 
because it is not consistently monotheistic.
Introduction
In the last forty years or so, many broadly traditional Christian theolo-
gians and philosophers have lined up behind a way of understanding 
the Trinity, according to which the “persons” of the Trinity really are 
three persons, that is, selves—so many subjects of experience, inten-
tional agents, each with his own intellect and will. In a series of papers, 
William Hasker has fought offensively and defensively on behalf of this 
“social” trinitarianism (hereafter, ST). He defends ST against many re-
cent objections by philosophical theologians, and argues both that the 
genuine Christian tradition requires belief in something like ST and that 
ST is what the historical mainstream tradition has always been getting 
at. Moreover, he’s authored trenchant critiques of some important rival 
approaches.1
Elsewhere I’ve argued that his replies to my deception objections to 
ST are completely unsuccessful.2 Here I shall discuss only Hasker’s posi-
tive thrusts, his claims about what ST amounts to. I shall argue that any 
Christian should reject it, because it implies polytheism (and the falsity of 
monotheism).3
1William Hasker, “Tri-Unity,” The Journal of Religion 50:1 (1970), 1–32; “Has a Trinitarian 
God Deceived Us?” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, ed. Thomas McCall 
and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 38–51; “A Leftovian Trinity,” 
Faith and Philosophy 26:2 (2009), 154–166; “Objections to Social Trinitariansm,” Religious Stud-
ies 46 (2010), 421–439; “Constitution and the Trinity: The Brower-Rea Proposal,” Faith and 
Philosophy 27:3 (2010), 321–329; “How to Think About the Trinity,” in Christian Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Colin Ruloff (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014).
2Dale Tuggy, “Divine Deception and Monotheism: A Reply to Hasker,” Religious Studies 
47 (2011), 109–115. Hasker replies in his “Deception and the Trinity: A Rejoinder to Tuggy,” 
Religious Studies 47:1 (2011), 117–120. My “Divine Deception and Monotheism” (unpub-
lished) continues the conversation. 
3There is much confusion about monotheism in the scholarly literatures. By “mono-
theism” I shall mean the thesis that there is exactly one GOD. A GOD is the sort of being 
which Yahweh is assumed and asserted to be in the Bible. Polytheism is normally taken 
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The First Quest
For Hasker the sine qua non of ST is the claim that the “persons” of the 
Trinity enjoy genuine personal relationships.4 In a 1970 essay, Hasker says 
that he assumes that the “persons” of the Trinity, but not so much the Trinity 
itself, are analogous to human persons.5 While not defining the term “per-
son” in the doctrine that God “is three persons,” he specifies that
A person is that which enters into personal relationships. . . . Each Person is to each 
Person as an “I” to a “Thou.”6
Hasker asserts that both the Bible and important fourth-century “fathers” 
support ST, and he boldly proposes “a reconstruction of the doctrine of 
the Trinity developed in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind.”7 
This recasting is needed, because
The Fathers may have resolved the problem [of answering the question: 
Three what in one what?] for themselves, but they did not resolve it for us.8
Moreover, Hasker wants to answer this question without falling into 
tritheism.9 He plausibly argues that a human “person must be regarded as 
a continuing [i.e., lasting through time] subject of experiences” which has 
a “nature,” which is “the ontological ground” of the person’s dispositions, 
and “is the real capacity . . . for having such experiences.”10 His reconstruc-
tion, then, is this:
the one individual and indivisible Nature of God is possessed by three Subjects, each 
of whom is really distinct from the other two and is the Subject of his own distinct 
experiences in the unity of the one divine nature and life.11
to be the thesis that there is more than one god—that is, roughly, more than one self with 
supernatural power, and far greater power than any ordinary human. A GOD is necessarily 
a god, but not vice-versa; GOD is the more specific concept. As just defined, “monothe-
ism” and “polytheism” are not obviously inconsistent; it seems there could be exactly one 
GOD but more than one god. However, in this paper, because of the Christian context, by 
“polytheism” I mean the claim that there is more than one GOD. Similarly, “tritheism” shall 
mean not that there are exactly three gods, but rather that there are exactly three GODS. 
For stylistic reasons, I shall use the conventional “god” to express the GOD concept. And 
I shall use the capitalized “God” only when using that word like a proper name and shall 
otherwise use “god.” On the god-GOD distinction see my “Divine Deception and Monothe-
ism” (unpublished).
4“Has a Trinitarian God Deceived Us?” 47 n15; cf. “Tri-Unity,” 4.
5“Tri-Unity,” 4. However, he proceeds to talk of the Trinity as if it were a self: “suppose . . . 
that this triune God desired to reveal himself to men” (5). 
6Ibid., 4, 5, original emphases.
7Ibid., 3; cf. 31. Hasker’s project here is a clear example of what I elsewhere call the project 
of Resolution of an apparent contradiction by Rational Reconstruction of the doctrine. See 





11Ibid., 27, original italics.
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One may ask: why is this not a sort of tritheism, wherein the three gods 
happen to share a nature? That they can be said to share “a life” doesn’t 
make them one god. Hasker argues that because they share a nature, they 
can’t but cooperate, and that they are somehow always involved in each 
other’s actions.12 He holds this shared nature not to be a generic or univer-
sal one, but a particular one,13 which is a “‘real potentiality’ for the divine 
experiences.”14 This, Hasker insists, is “a significant, and not a merely 
nominal, affirmation of unity.”15
True enough—nature sharing would be a kind of objective unity. But 
why think this implies that those three selves are in or somehow amount 
to one god? There’s a dilemma here. Either it is or is not possible for di-
verse (non-identical) things to share one and the same particular nature, 
one and the same individual potentiality for experiences. Suppose that it 
is possible: why then think that, because divine persons share a nature, 
they are one god? Might not three gods share a nature, just as there might 
be Siamese triplets which share, say, a certain bone or organ? On the other 
hand, if it is not possible, then it is not actual, nor can it be part of or 
implied by any true Trinity theory.
Can an individual property be shared by two or three things? Philoso-
phers fall into four camps on the topic of properties or qualities. Some 
deny there are such entities as properties. Others believe in properties, 
but only understood as universals. A third group affirms properties, but 
only as particulars. Finally, some believe in both particular and univer-
sal properties. For the first two groups, it will be a necessary truth that 
there are no shared particular properties, because necessarily there are no 
such things as particular properties. Members of the third group typically 
hold properties to be “necessarily such that they are exhibited by just one 
object.”16 And members of the fourth group posit shared properties, but 
only universal ones. Presumably, for them as well, in principle there can’t 
be a shared particular property. Thus, surveying the theories, if there are 
properties, it seems impossible that there be a shared particular property. 
In the context of a general metaphysics of properties, no one takes this 
option seriously. Is this not a strong reason against any theological theory 
positing a shared particular property?
12Ibid., 27–28, original italics. He says, “Each action of a divine Person takes place in and 
by the one Nature of God—in the ‘one mind’ of God, if we may so speak.” (27) I’m not sure how 
to take this, or how it could be consistent with his claim that each of the persons has what are 
only his own acts, and presumably his own, unshared point of view. (28)
13“Tri-Unity,” 28.
14Ibid., 29.
15Ibid. He also asserts that “When we regard the Persons abstractly, as separated from the 
Nature, they are mere abstractions, and cannot be parts of anything; but regarded concretely, 
each Person possesses and is the whole indivisible Being [i.e., Nature] of God” (30, original 
emphases). I’m not sure what he here asserts, or whether or not it is consistent with his claim 
that each Person is a self. 
16Michael Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 73.
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In saying this, I’m thinking of fundamental, basic, or underived 
properties, as it were some of the bottom-level metaphysical ingredi-
ents of things. But if one has a looser concept of a property, on which a 
whole may “borrow” some of its parts’ properties, then one may allow 
for shared particular properties. Suppose that human selves are living 
organisms, and that conjoined twins are overlapping organisms, physi-
cal objects which share certain parts. Now consider conjoined twins who 
share a heart. It would be plausible, on these assumptions, that the one 
twin’s power of pumping blood just is the other twin’s power of pumping 
blood. This would be plausible because each twin has that power just by 
having one and the same heart, with, we presume, exactly one blood-
pumping power.
I don’t endorse this metaphor of property “borrowing,” and suspect that 
such talk confuses properties and predicates. But for present purposes, I’ll 
grant that it makes sense in the above case. The persons of the Trinity are 
not supposed to share any proper part, so this sort of case neither shows 
nor even suggests that it is possible for them to share a particular property.
One may object that it is precisely the doctrine of the Trinity which gives 
us reason to believe there can be a shared particular property.17 Maybe 
ordinary particular properties can’t be shared, but the divine nature is no 
ordinary particular property, and is shared by non-identical entities. And 
haven’t great Christian minds, for example, the medieval philosopher-
theologian Anselm, believed this?18 Moreover, isn’t it just part and parcel 
of Christian commitment to believe that this particular property, the di-
vine nature, is shared by non-identical entities?
Taking the last point first: no. There have long been unitarian Christians 
(who hold that the one god, God, is numerically identical to the Father, so 
that God is, as is sometimes said, “unipersonal,” or more clearly, just is 
a certain great self), modalists (who hold that the three “persons” of the 
Trinity are not distinct entities, but are rather in some sense ways the one 
god is—hence, just one entity has the divine nature), and social trinitarians 
who hold the divine nature to be a shared universal property. One might 
object that none of these have been in the catholic mainstream, but this is 
mistaken—leading catholic intellectuals have held all three views.19
I agree with the objector that knowing a first-rate thinker has believed 
something is a reason to believe it, but it is often not, by itself, a sufficient 
reason. This is particularly so when it comes down to theses which clash 
17I thank a reader for this journal for raising these objections, which I have paraphrased.
18E.g., Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, Anselm (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 134–137.
19By “catholic” I mean Christians within that mainstream, bishop-ruled Christian move-
ment which later split into Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Magisterial Protestant 
factions. Here are some eminent catholic thinkers who have held, respectively, the three 
positions mentioned: Samuel Clarke and Origen (Anglican, catholic or “proto-orthodox”), 
Karl Rahner and Karl Barth (Roman Catholic, Reformed), and Cornelius Plantinga and John 
Philoponus (Reformed, Orthodox). 
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with our fundamental intuitions. Most of us have this intuition: if there’s 
such a thing as this property: this paperclip’s flexibility, that individual power 
or disposition couldn’t also be had by another paperclip. And changing 
to mental properties: My individual ability to empathize couldn’t also be 
had by you. Consider now Hasker’s suggestion that the Father’s ability to 
experience just is the Son’s ability. That the subject has shifted to spirits, 
or to divine selves, seems irrelevant, for this scenario seems impossible as 
strongly as does the paperclip scenario. The point seems to hold generally 
for any property which is particular and not universal (again, assuming 
that there are properties).
Thus, the burden is on trinitarians who posit a shared individual divine 
nature, to give us a reason, other than that their theory requires it, for 
thinking that it is even possible for a individual property to be had by more 
than one entity. Until they do this, their claim that an individual divine 
nature is shared is not well motivated.
As for Anselm, insofar as I follow his reasoning, it is that the divine 
nature can’t be a shared universal, or else the Trinity would be three gods. 
But all properties (so, all natures or essential properties) are either uni-
versals or particulars. Therefore, the shared divine nature is a particular 
property. The best recent commenters on Anselm note that he simply 
doesn’t have developed views about universals, and this is probably why 
he never considers objections like the one just given.20 I suggest that in 
the light of nine hundred more years of philosophizing about properties, 
more must be said, and account must be taken of the fact that when not 
defending Trinity theories, seemingly no philosopher takes seriously the 
idea of a fundamental shared particular property.
Note that if this intuition is correct (that it is impossible for distinct things 
to share a fundamental particular property), then any “two” things sharing 
any fundamental particular property (nature or not) must be numerically 
one. This explains why many trinitarians assume that if, e.g., the Father and 
Son share a particular nature, then they must be one being. Indeed, that is 
so. But that is to say that they are numerically one being, that they are 
numerically identical. That “nature” is very ambiguous helps to hide this 
implication of the claim. It appears, then, that we can answer the question 
above, as to why there couldn’t be three gods sharing a particular nature. 
The answer is that if things share a particular fundamental property of any 
sort, this implies that they are a single thing. On the imagined scenario, the 
“three” gods would actually be one god, and one entity/being.
Does this insight doom any Trinity theory? Not necessarily. Recently, 
philosophical theologians have floated the idea that the divine nature is 
a property, but is neither a universal property nor a particular property.21 
20Visser and Williams, Anselm, 254.
21See Michael Rea, “Hylomorphism and the Incarnation,” in The Metaphysics of the Incarna-
tion, ed. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
134–152, section 6. Preprint online: http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Hylomorphism%20
and%20Incarnation.pdf; and Michael Rea, “Hylomorphism Reconditioned,” Philosophi-
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About this, I will only say that if nature-sharing is supposed to explain 
why three divine selves are one god, we will have to understand what it is 
about this sort of nature (which is neither particular nor universal) which 
makes this so.
I conclude that Hasker’s claim that the three divine selves enjoy an 
objective sort of unity in the sense that they share an individual power 
or capacity needs further support to be plausible. As things stand, the 
theory seems a necessary falsehood. Further, we can see why Hasker and 
others suppose that individual-nature-sharing would make three divine 
selves one god. It would. But it would also make them one being. It is 
self-evident that if some x and some y are the same god, then x is a god, y 
is a god, and x and y are one and the same (are numerically identical). Yet, 
Hasker would agree, the Father, Son, and Spirit can’t be one and the same, 
for they have qualitatively differed from one another.
At the end of the essay, Hasker asks “whether ‘personality’ is most cor-
rectly ascribed to God in his unity or to the personae individually.”22 He 
answers that
The personae are Persons! Each of them is a “he,” and to each Person distinct 
divine actions are appropriately ascribed. Yet such is the oneness of the 
Godhead [i.e., the divine nature], such is the concurrent, united operation 
of all three Persons, that the Three together may be regarded and spoken 
of in the singular as “he”—as . . . a single divine “personal society.” Thus, 
both the entire Godhead [i.e., the Trinity] and the Persons individually may 
be referred to as “he,” but the latter usage must be held to be systematically 
and ontologically fundamental.23
In other words, each “person” of the Trinity is a self, and the whole Trinity 
is not a self, though it is a single, unified reality, and because the members 
of the Trinity are so unified, it can seem like an intelligent agent itself, and 
so it can be thought of and spoken of as if it were a self.
Aren’t we advised here to be tritheists, but to soothe our worries by 
personifiying this group of three gods, talking about them and thinking 
about them as if they were themselves a single god? At the end of his essay, 
Hasker admits that
the whole position may be simply dismissed as tritheistic. Our only answer 
. . . is that Jesus Christ is presented in the New Testament as one who does 
what only God can do, says what only God can say, and is in fact very God 
himself in his essential being. And we believe that he is truly so presented.24
cal Perspectives 25 (2012), preprint online: http://nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Hylomorphism%20 
Reconditioned.pdf. Similarly, Richard Cross reads one early catholic theologian as holding 
that the divine nature is neither concrete nor abstract. (Richard Cross, “Latin Trinitarianism: 
Some Conceptual and Historical Considerations,” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the 
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The thrust here, clearer in the whole context, is that we ought not let a 
priori intuitions about what is impossible or possible prevent us from 
believing what has in fact been revealed as actual (and so which must be 
possible). This is, I think, an important and correct point to make, but it 
isn’t germane here. Suppose it is correct that the New Testament presents 
Jesus as being “very God himself.” It might follow that some sort of “high” 
two-nature christology is called for (i.e., Jesus is divine, has a divine na-
ture, as much as the Father) but what does this have to do with the worry 
about tritheism? Here Hasker only confesses his unshakable confidence 
that the mainstream catholic tradition of theology has got the New Testa-
ment right, and that the New Testament is reliable in what it says about 
Jesus. He tacitly confesses that he has no answer to the tritheism objection. 
But a Trinity doctrine is by definition supposed to be monotheistic (and not 
also tritheistic).
Thus, though this piece throughout displays the many philosophical 
virtues for which Hasker is known, in the end it is a theoretical failure. 
He aims for a theory which does not “imply a denial or weakening of 
the unity of God.”25 This desideratum is conveniently unclear. But if we 
read it as requiring the truth of monotheism and the falsity of polytheism, 
Hasker’s theory comes up short.26
The Second Quest
But that is Hasker’s first, not his last discussion of the Trinity. More than 
forty years on, Hasker has published the boldly titled “How to Think 
About the Trinity.”27 In addition, he’s weighed in with critical comments 
on two recent Trinity theories by analytic philosophers, in each case at-
tempting to derive positive lessons about the doctrine. Here I shall weigh 
his advice, concentrating on how he construes “the” doctrine itself, leav-
ing aside most of his many methodological points.
The persons of the Trinity are, for Hasker, so many selves. At times he 
pulls his punch and describes them more ambiguously as “personal,” “so-
cial,” and as “centers of consciousness.” But they stand in non-reflexive 
interpersonal relationships to one another and to humans, and this implies 
that they are in the final analysis, and after the last nod to analogy, literally 
selves.28 While they enjoy perfect fellowship, and act with regard to other 
things in a perfectly unified way, these factors alone do not, Hasker plau-
sibly holds, make them a single god.29 Hasker cites three further factors, 
25Ibid., 31.
26See note 3 above on my usage of “monotheism” and “polytheism” here.
27“How to Think About the Trinity,” in Christian Philosophy of Religion, ed. Colin Ruloff.
28Hasker, “How to Think About the Trinity,” numbers 2–4. As he says elsewhere, “what 
is the nature of the Persons, as ST conceives it? Put simply, the Persons are persons” (“Objec-
tions to Social Trinitarianism,” 2).
29“In order to secure the unity of the Trinity, it is necessary though not sufficient to affirm 
that the Persons enjoy with one another the highest conceivable degree of interpersonal or 
‘social’ unity as well as functional unity in their dealings with the created world” (“How to 
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which I assume are meant to be jointly sufficient, perhaps together with 
the two other features just mentioned, to make the three one god. On the 
other hand, it may be that it is really the last claim which is meant by itself 
to suffice for their being one god.
First, he endorses the patristic claims that the Son is eternally “begotten” 
of the Father, while the Spirit eternally “proceeds” from the Father and the 
Son. Hasker notes that such doctrines offer “an explanation of the existence 
of more than one divine Person,” and he urges that they have “some scrip-
tural support.” Seemingly conceding that the traditionally cited biblical 
proof-texts imply no such claims, he argues that terms such as logos and 
“son” are “strongly suggestive of a derivative status for the Son.”30
This may be so, but Hasker makes a big leap in claiming that such 
terms give “significant support” for the doctrines in question, for they are 
consistent with various subordinationist unitarian theories, such as that 
propounded by Origen. On such theories, the one god is identical to the 
Father, and the Son exists because of the Father. Though such theories 
may allow that the Son is in some sense “divine,” he enjoys this status 
because of the Father, who is greater. As Origen says,
some of those among the multitudes of believers . . . because of their rash-
ness suppose that the Saviour is the greatest and supreme God. But we at 
least do not take that view, since we believe him who said: “The Father who 
sent me is greater than I.”31
Hasker’s main point, though, is just that these claims feature prominently 
in the Constantinopolitan Creed; he is unwilling to countenance that these 
fourth-century “fathers” could have been off track. Thus, he scolds fel-
low “social” trinitarians Craig and Moreland for denying the generation 
and procession claims. But he doesn’t address their grounds for so doing. 
There’s a significant consensus among modern exegetes that no biblical text 
either asserts, implies, or assumes the eternal generation and procession 
claims.32 And philosophically, it is plausible that these derivation claims 
Think About the Trinity,” number 4). I take it that the “unity” in view is the unity possessed 
by a single god. 
30“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 5. 
31Origen, Origen: Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1965), 462 [=Book 8, section 14]. For an overview of Origen’s views on the Trinity, 
see Alvan Lamson, The Church of the First Three Centuries (London, 1875) , 214–229 (reprint 
Toronto: University of Toronto Libraries, 2012).
32J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian World-
view (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 594–595. Moreland and Craig refer to the 
discussion and summary in John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton, 
IL: Crossway, 2001), 488–492. On this point, some evangelicals are coming around to a point 
long ago argued by unitarians—that the traditional proof-texts for the doctrines of eternal 
generation and procession have been misread. See, e.g., John Wilson, Scripture Proofs and 
Scriptural Illustrations of Unitarianism, 3rd ed. (London, 1846, reprint Morrisville, NC: Lulu 
.com, 2007, 190–196). At least one noted nineteenth-century evangelical, trinitarian exegete, 
and theologian drew the same conclusion, on the same grounds—divine aseity and lack of 
biblical support (Moses Stuart, Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son of God [Andover, 
MA: Mark Newman, 1822, reprint Morrisville, NC: Lulu.com, 2010).
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imply that Christ and the Spirit are not fully divine, since full divinity 
requires aseity—not existing because of anything else. On the traditional 
generation and procession doctrines, the Father has aseity, but the Son and 
Spirit do not. Instead of engaging Moreland and Craig on this interesting 
objection (I’m inclined to take their side, that a maximally great being must 
exist and have its essential perfections a se) Hasker dismisses this concern 
on the grounds that if generation or procession ruled out divinity, then the 
Constantinopolitan creed would be inconsistent with itself.33 I take it that 
Hasker holds that divine providence would not allow this. But even if full 
divinity doesn’t imply aseity, still, one may think that the Father, being the 
origin or source or cause of the Son, the one from whom the Son gets his 
divine nature, must therefore be greater than the Son—even though the Son 
is “true God from true God.”
If we’re worried about how all this counts as monotheism, it’s hard to 
see the relevance of affirming generation and procession; for all we know, 
if there could be three gods, it could be that they stand in this pattern 
of dependence (the second depending on the first, and the third in some 
different way depending on both the first and the second, while the first 
depends on nothing).
But perhaps these causal or quasi-causal relations are supposed to 
work in conjunction with the second factor, namely that the Three share 
a single “common nature which is concrete and is numerically one.”34 As 
we’ve seen, however, this strategy works too well, for individual-nature-
sharing seems to imply being numerically one. The problem discussed 
above hasn’t been addressed.
Third, Hasker tells us that
The tension of “one” versus “three” is resolved by postulating that there 
is in the Trinity a single divine mind with three personal centers of con-
sciousness, knowledge, and will.35
How should we unpack this new claim? Hasker gives two thrusts. First, 
he quotes Moreland and Craig, to the effect that the one god is one soul, 
but not one person. I just am my soul, and my soul is (identical to) a self/
person, in their view, because it has one set of cognitive (and presum-
ably, active and affective) faculties.36 In contrast, say Moreland and Craig, 
God has three such sets of powers, and so in some sense is, in their words 
“three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition.”37 But is 
this possible, Hasker asks? Well, we don’t know it to be impossible, he 
argues, citing split-brain experiments and victims of multiple personality 
disorder.
33“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 5. 
34Ibid., number 6.
35Ibid., number 7.
36Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 238–239.
37“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 7.
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But let’s first return to Moreland’s and Craig’s claim. This soul (an im-
material entity) which is God has three faculties, that is, three general 
powers, each of which is sufficient to make it a self.38 This doesn’t make the 
soul be three selves; they would agree, I think, that identity is a one-one 
relation, so that it is impossible for several distinct things to be identical 
to some one thing. Rather, this soul would thereby be just one self whose 
self-hood is over-determined. Nor would it follow that this soul somehow 
supports or underlies three selves. Suppose Ralph is a rotten husband, 
and that he has three tendencies each of which is sufficient to make him 
a rotten husband. First, Ralph is habitually unfaithful. Second, Ralph is 
a chronic liar. Third, Ralph is a coward. This doesn’t make Ralph three 
bad husbands; it makes him a single, triply bad one. His wife need only 
divorce one man.
Thus, if it is really God which has these three faculties, e.g., three abilities 
truly to think, I suppose in three different ways (whatever that amounts to) 
“I exist,” then it does not follow that God “is three persons,” or that he’s in 
any sense composed of three selves. What follows is that God is a self, able 
to think (etc.) in three different ways, by exercising three different powers. 
Moreland and Craig want to say that God “is” three persons in the sense 
that God “supports” three persons, as a sort of substratum, but again, 
they are his powers, not (merely) the powers of his parts, if indeed the 
“persons” should be thought of as parts on their theory. Thus, when they 
identify the one God with this aforementioned soul,39 they make God to be 
a self after all, but one which can live in three ways. He’s personal, but he’s 
also a person (self), albeit an unusual one. Each “person” of the Trinity, on 
this theory, would be this one self thinking in a certain way, exercising one 
of his three cognitive powers. But this runs contrary to their, and Hasker’s, 
claim that the “persons” of the Trinity stand in personal relationships to 
one another.40 No self can enjoy an inter-personal (non-reflexive) relation-
ship with himself.
But despite their talk of “God” having three properties sufficient for 
personhood, the above can’t be what Moreland and Craig intend; after 
all, they deny that God/the Trinity is “a fourth person or agent”—not be-
cause God’s the only self in the Trinity, but rather because it (God) isn’t a self 
(hence, not a fourth self).41 Perhaps what they want to say is that “God” 
38William Lane Craig, “Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-
Snyder,” Philosophia Christi 8 (2006), 101–113, see 104–106. (Partially reprinted as “Another 
Glance at Trinity Monotheism” in McCall and Rea, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the 
Trinity, 126–130, see 130.)
39Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 594; Craig, “Trinity Monotheism Once 
More,” 101.58
40Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 582–583, 588, 594–595. 
41Ibid., 591. In personal correspondence, Craig confirms this interpretation on which the 
one soul which is God is not a self. Although in one place Craig calls the persons of the Trin-
ity God’s “minds” (“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 101; cf. Philosophical Foundations, 593), 
these are to be taken not as God’s powers or faculties of thinking, but rather as selves, thinkers, 
internal to God (e-mail to author of 9/23/10).
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is a soul (or at any rate a non-physical substance or entity—“soul” may 
be misleading here) with three powers sufficient not for being a self, but 
rather, sufficient for somehow containing a “center of consciousness.”42 But are 
these “centers” selves or not? If not, the central desideratum of ST isn’t 
met, for non-selves can’t be friends. If they are selves, then a ST proponent 
who adopts the Moreland-Craig model must think the triune God to be a 
complex substance composed of three selves.43 But if they are substances 
(or simply concrete, individual entities which are agents, knowers, lov-
ers) they can’t be “in” this one soul in the way that a property is “in” or 
“had by” its bearer; each is an entity in its own right. And each being 
omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent,44 they appear to be so many 
gods, just amalgamated into a complex whole thing called “God,” which 
isn’t a god, though it has gods as parts. If there can be more than one 
god, why can’t they be joined to form some whole? I don’t know; thus, if 
this is what Moreland and Craig intend, I don’t know why anyone should 
consider it a sort of monotheism.
Daniel Howard-Snyder has pointedly pressed the monotheism objec-
tion.45 In reply, Craig asserts that there’s no problem with their ST implying 
that God isn’t (identical to) a self, since “That’s part and parcel of Trinitar-
ian orthodoxy.”46 This would come as a shock to contemporary Christian 
laypeople and theologians who hold to a one-self understanding of the 
Trinity, on which the Trinity just is a certain self, God, who exists (or: acts, 
lives, manifests, or reveals himself) in three different ways. It would also 
42Moreland and Craig introduce ST as the view that “in God there are three distinct cen-
ters of self-consciousness, each with its proper intellect and will” (Philosophical Foundations, 
583). On this reading, their analogy to human souls mentioned above would on their views 
be a poor one. They hold to a dualism on which I am numerically identical to a soul. They 
say that just as having one set of mental faculties makes my soul (that is, me) one self, God’s 
having three such faculties make him three selves. But what that God-soul has three of, they 
really want to say, are properties sufficient for not for being, but rather for containing a self. In 
contrast, I have no such property; although I’m a self, I don’t contain any selves within me. 
43This is the final option discussed by Craig (“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 113). I’ve 
just argued that they are already committed to this; given what else they want to say, it’s the 
only option available.
44“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 110. I take it they are straightforwardly so, and not in 
virtue of being parts of a thing (God, the Trinity) which has those features. 
45Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism,” Philosophia Christi 5:2 (2003), 375–403, 
see 401–403.
46“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 106. Craig adds that “Monotheists concur that 
God is personal, not that He is a person” (ibid.) At first glance, this seems to be an ad hoc, 
theory-saving redefinition of “monotheism.” However, it is not only social trinitarians who 
understand “God” to be something other than a self. Many medieval theologians, be they 
Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, modeled their concept of the ultimate being in large measure 
after the neoplatonic “One,” and arguably don’t believe God to be a god (i.e., a perfect self—
that is, a GOD—see note 3 above). On such views God isn’t a self, but is rather “personal,” 
self-like in some way, e.g., it appears to us to be a self, it is commonly mistaken for a self, or 
self-implying concepts apply only analogously to it. It would appear, then, than Craig is cor-
rect, if the term “monotheist” may be understood in sense so broad as to include ST theorists 
and medieval theologians, along with the many Jews, Christians, and Muslims who believe 
God to be a perfect Self. In my view, what matters to a discussion of the Trinity is what sort of 
monotheism the Bible asserts. On this see my “Divine Deception and Monotheism.”
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come as a shock to theologians who were considered within the catholic 
fold in the second, third, and fourth centuries, what we now call subordi-
nationists and monarchians, to leave aside the so-called “Arians.”47 These 
assumed the one god to be numerically identical to the Father, and at least 
in many cases, they held the Father to be a self.
In sum, the Moreland-Craig theory either abandons ST for a one-self 
account of the Trinity, giving up the claim that the members of the Trinity 
enjoy an ideal friendship, or it is an unappealing tritheism, in which three 
gods are parts of a whole, which is dubbed “God,” though it is not itself a 
god. But monotheism is the view that there’s exactly one god, not the view 
that there’s at least one god-supporting thing (this “soul”). The biblical 
God is not a what, but rather a who.48
Hasker ought not claim, then, that Moreland and Craig give us “a helpful 
and illuminating statement of the central claim of social Trinitarianism.”49 
But let’s move on to the abnormal psychology cases, for Hasker claims 
these are somewhat analogous to what he understands the Trinity to be. 
So as not to multiply words, I’ll assume the reader is familiar with split 
brain and multiple personality disorder phenomena. Hasker urges that 
the “most obvious reading of the evidence” is that in either case we have 
“a single mind” which contains “two or more centers of consciousness or 
psychological subjects.”50 This is of course plenty disputable. But Hasker 
doesn’t offer this as a metaphysical model of the Trinity. His sole point is 
a defensive one:
[T]he point of the examples is not to show that something precisely analo-
gous to the Trinity exists in ordinary (or even extraordinary) experience. . . . 
The point of the examples is a conceptual one, to show that our concepts of 
“mind” and “psychological subject” admit (or can be revised so as to admit) 
the possibility that a single mind contains two or more such subjects. This 
possibility, I maintain, is indeed exhibited in the split-brain and multiple 
personality cases.51
47Late-first to early-second-century catholic “monarchians” claimed to uphold the “mon-
archy,” the one rule, of the Father, in reaction against subordinationists, whom they accused 
of denying monotheism. As we have only the writings of their bitter enemies, it is hard to get 
clear on their views, which surely varied in the details. Tertullian accuses them of identifying 
Father and Son, and it is possible that some did. But probably some held that the Father just 
is the one true God, and the divine element in the man Jesus, the Word, was God or a prop-
erty or mode of God (cf. John 14:10). “Arians” were so-called by their theological enemies; 
they were 4th c. subordinationist theologians who held (as did other catholic theologians 
before Origen) that before the creation of the cosmos, God (i.e., the Father) created his Son, 
by whom he then created the cosmos (cf. Proverbs 8:22). The claim that Father and Son are 
eternally homoousios (one substance or one essence), first voted in by the bishops at Nicea 
(325 CE), was meant to exclude them from Catholic Christianity. 
48On this point see Anthony Buzzard, Jesus Was Not a Trinitarian: A Call to Return to the 
Creed of Jesus (Morrow, GA: Restoration Fellowship, 2007), 46, and my “Divine Deception 
and Monotheism.”
49Hasker, “How to Think About the Trinity,” number 7.
50Ibid. 
51Ibid.
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His point, then, is that a certain supposition isn’t known to be contradictory. 
But what is this claim? As best I can tell, it is that there is a self which con-
tains or is composed of two or more selves. But this point, even if correct, is 
of no aid to Hasker’s ST, for at the end of this piece, he tells us that
In view of the indissoluble unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the 
work of creation and redemption, it is appropriate in some contexts to refer 
to the Trinity as a whole as if to a single person or agent.52
That “as if” is important. The Trinity, for him, is not itself a self, though 
it can be thought of, and talked about as if it were. Hasker tacitly admits, 
then, that the analogies are not apt, for the mental patients in question are 
selves—it is one human self who checks in the hospital and is treated for 
her multiple personality disorder. And it is one human self who endures 
the effects of having her corpus callosum severed. But then, if Hasker’s 
interpretation of these phenomena is reasonable, it would support the 
possibility of something irrelevant to his ST—that a self may contain or be 
composed of others.
In the end, I can’t discern why Hasker thinks his theory is monotheistic, 
other than, that it just must be, since it is meant to be an orthodox theory. 
I understand the three selves, but I don’t see why anyone should hold 
them to in some sense be (be parts of? constitute?) one god. I can see why 
you might think they’re one thing, one entity. After all, it is plausible that 
non-universal natures, or non-universal properties of any kind, can’t be 
shared by multiple things. So whatever “things” have a particular nature, 
such as Bill’s humanity—things like Bill Hasker, and Mrs. Hasker’s hus-
band—must be one and the same. But I take it these Three can’t be one 
in that way (numerically one) as they differ, Hasker would say, in their 
properties of origin—none (Father), Father (Son), Father-and-Son (Spirit). 
And even if one jettisons the generation and procession claims, they will 
differ in other ways.
What does monotheism require anyway? “Monotheism” is the view 
that there’s only one god. The lowercase “god” is a fairly vague word, but 
in the relevant sense, which implies being a proper object of worship, it 
entails being a self.53 As Samuel Clarke observes,
worship [is] nothing else, but the acknowledgement or payment of due  
honor, correspondent to the true dominion and dignity of the person to 
whom it is paid . . . for all worship or honor is personal, paid not to a meta-
physical substance, but to an intelligent agent.54
52Ibid., number 5, emphasis added.
53In the sense relevant, I mean, to Christian, devotional spirituality. In certain theoreti-
cal contexts, there is talk of a “God” or “god” which is not a self. See notes 3 and 46 above. 
54Samuel Clarke, A Reply to the Objections of Robert Nelson, Esq. in The Works of Samuel 
Clarke, D. D., Vol. 4., ed. John Clarke (London, 1738, reprint: The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trin-
ity and Related Writings [Morrisville, NC: Lulu.com, 2007], 251–324, 278). I have modernized 
Clarke’s capitalization. Cf. Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism,” 400–402.
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Even Hasker’s characterization of Old Testament monotheism, on which 
this one god is the creator, implies that this one god is some self or other, 
creation being an intentional action.55 But Hasker counsels that
Christian thinkers ought to maintain a certain openness in their under-
standing of the unity of God . . . [not] prematurely adopt[ing] a definition 
of divine unity that may cause a problem when it comes time to state the 
doctrine of the Trinity.56
In particular, he urges, it needn’t be “acceptable also to Jews.” But why 
not? The Jews (whether we mean first-century Jews, like the authors of 
the New Testament, or later Jews) either have or haven’t remained faithful 
to divine revelation on this score. If they have, and one’s conception of 
divine unity is inconsistent with their view, then we’re holding later rev-
elation not merely to complete or disambiguate early revelation, but we’re 
holding the two to strictly contradict. This is not, I take it, the Christian 
doctrine of progressive revelation, but rather something like the contro-
versial Islamic doctrine of abrogation.57 If the Jews have not been faithful 
to divine revelation regarding monotheism, then let’s say what they’ve 
misunderstood or wrongly added to it, so as to make clear that our Trinity 
theory is consistent with what the Jewish scriptures (which are also ours) 
say about Yahweh. Hasker’s advice here regarding “monotheism” is mere 
special pleading on behalf of his controversial theory.
Help from the Competition?
But might we gain any clarity from Hasker’s interaction with two other 
highly creative philosophical theologians—authors of rival theories who 
are also important critics of ST, Brian Leftow and Michael Rea? Leaving 
aside the dialectic Hasker has with each, what positive lessons for ST does 
he draw from their work?
From Rea, Hasker adopts a concept of constitution, as in: “A batch of 
clay constitutes a pot.”58 The basic idea is that one thing may constitute 
multiple other things of a different sort. In Hasker’s hands, the consti-
tution relation is no longer part of a relative-identity approach (i.e., one 
which depends on a controversial concept of numerical sameness which 
is not absolute identity), and constitution relations are asymmetric. He 
admits it to be unclear quite what “constitution” means in this new, non-
physical context, but presumably he’ll say that the meaning is analogous 
to more familiar material cases.59 Hasker suggests,
55“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 1.
56Ibid. 
57Neal Robinson, Discovering the Qur’an: A Contemporary Approach to a Veiled Text, 2nd ed. 
(London: SCM Press, 2003), 64–69, 74–75.
58William Hasker, “Constitution and the Trinity,” 12. 
59Ibid., 329n9.
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Each of the Persons, we may say, is constituted by the divine nature but is not 
identical with that nature. And in virtue of the fact that each of the Persons is 
constituted by the divine nature, each Person is God (though not, to be sure, 
is a God, an assertion which has consistently been avoided by the Trinitar-
ian tradition).60
This requires some exposition. Hasker glosses the phrase “each of the Per-
sons is in himself God” as meaning that the “divine attributes . . . belong to 
each Person fully.”61 So by saying that each “is God” (a confusing phrase, 
given the name-like quality of the capitalized English “God”) he means 
that each is divine, which amounts to each having the divine nature. Each, 
he says, “is wholly God, but not the whole of God.” Less confusingly: each 
is divine, but none is the only divine thing. Or equivalently: each has the 
concrete divine nature, but is not the only thing which has the concrete 
divine nature.
Again, the monotheism slips away. A divine thing, or a thing which has 
the divine nature, is by definition a god, and there are (at least) three gods 
on Hasker’s theory, even given his prohibition of saying, e.g., of the Son, 
that he is “a god.” He wants to say, I think, that something which has the 
one, concrete, divine nature is “the God.” Let him say it; nonetheless, he’s 
posited three numerically distinct things which enjoy this condition. As 
we’ve seen, each of his divine persons qualitatively differs from the other 
two, and is therefore numerically other than both of his fellow divinities.
But perhaps there is help to be had in Brian Leftow’s creative specu-
lations on the subject. Hasker, I think correctly, congratulates Leftow’s 
theory on its preservation of monotheism.62 In the paper in question Leftow 
suggests that the each “person” in the Trinity is, at bottom, God living his 
life in a certain way.63 But why is it monotheistic? Hasker observes, “In 
Leftow’s proposal there is just one divine being; there is a single person 
who is God.”64 Indeed—God is a god and the only god. In the ancient near 
east and throughout the Bible a god is by definition some sort of super self. 
60Ibid., 329, original emphases.
61“Objections to Social Trinitarianism,” 434.
62Ibid., 435.
63See my “Trinity,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/trinity/, section 2.1. In a later work, 
Leftow goes farther, arguing that the “persons” of the Trinity are truly selves, but selves 
which exist because of certain events in the life of the one God. In his words, “the Trinity 
arises because God lives His life in three discrete streams of events at once . . . these are 
streams of mental events, and each such stream is the life of a Locke-person. . . . There is 
just one God who generates and lives as the three Persons, by generating and living in three 
distinct mental streams” (Brian Leftow, “Modes without Modalism,” in Persons: Human and 
Divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman [New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007], 357–375, 374). While the earlier piece propounds a one-self Trinity, in the later piece 
Leftow insists that Locke-persons really are selves (367), so the account seems to have four 
selves in the Trinity: God, Father, Son, and Spirit, with the first in some sense causing the 
second, who causes the third and fourth. 
64“Objections to Social Trinitarianism,” 434.
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So if there is exactly one god, there is exactly one super self of some sort. 
Hasker suggests that Leftow’s theory could stand a little adjustment—in-
stead of God being one self living his life in three “strands,” Hasker says, 
“we simply posit a distinct subject of experience for each of the strands.”65 
And by “distinct subject,” he of course means a divine self, a god, so we’re 
back to tritheism.
For all Hasker’s confidence in asserting “the” doctrine of the Trinity, 
it seems that he’s unclear about just what that doctrine is. It is sobering 
that someone as informed, able, and serious as Hasker is struggling in 
this way. Nor is he a bold speculator or a crank; to the contrary, he’s well-
versed in ancient and recent catholic theology, and he patiently tries to 
mine insights from recent work by some of our ablest Christian philoso-
phers. Despite his open theism, he’s very confident that divine providence 
has lead mainstream, catholic Christianity along a correct path here. In his 
view, this path is, or at least eventually led to, ST. Hasker doesn’t make 
the anachronistic claim that these theologians asserted ST, but he wants to 
be, as it were, walking further down the same paths. Whether he actually 
succeeds in this is another matter.66
Conclusion
We should not take Hasker’s advice on “How to Think About the Trinity.” 
While it’s been observed that views advertised as “social trinitarianism” 
make it “sound equivalent to the thesis that the Doctrine of the Trinity is 
true but modalism is false,”67 Hasker is clearer; he stipulates that the real 
core of ST is just the three, co-equal divine selves. This certainly has, in 
recent times, been a popular idea or image: a loving community of divine 
friends. We should be grateful that Hasker has vigorously, carefully, and 
systematically pursued a precise theoretical articulation of this.
But I’ve argued that Hasker has succeeded only in constructing a new 
version of polytheism. His theory features three gods, which must be 
numerically different because they’re qualitatively different. Hasker tries 
to cover this abundance of gods with a fig leaf of monotheistic language 
and a smokescreen of analogy appeals. Hasker asserts that there is “one 
only living and true God,”68 but as we’ve seen, it turns out that “God” 
here is a group of gods which is itself somewhat self-like. We can’t say 
that he clearly and consistently asserts monotheism—that there is exactly 
one being like the Yahweh of Isaiah, one true god. He does theorize that 
65Ibid., 436.
66In a longer version of this paper, I argued here that he fails in this; I show that some of 
the theologians he appeals to are hopelessly un- and implicitly anti-ST. This cut section is 
available online as “Historical supplement to ‘Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory’ 
(Dale),” http://trinities.org/blog/?p=4142.
67Trenton Merricks, “Split Brains and the Godhead,” in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in 
Honor of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Tom Crisp, Matthew Davidson, and David Vander Laan (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2006), 299–326, 306.
68“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 1.
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these divine selves share a particular property, a nature, which implies 
that they are one and the same—one and the same god, but also (contrary 
to both Hasker’s intentions and the New Testament) one and the same self. 
If there is no other particular divine nature, then the account would imply 
monotheism. But that’s not good enough; it’s agreed all around (or nearly 
so—inconsistency has its fans) that a successful Trinity theory must imply 
monotheism without also implying polytheism.69
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69My thanks to William Lane Craig, Richard Cross, Tom Flint, three readers for this jour-
nal, and Bill Hasker for helpful correspondence relating to earlier drafts of this paper.
